The Global Pandemic Mitigation Project (the “Project”) advocates for the adoption of mandatory, enforceable requirements or trade or aid incentives that would cause countries to provide immediate notification and grant of access to experts in case of a pandemic outbreak.
This could be accomplished by unilateral legislation or Executive action in major market countries, such as the United States or Canada.
Alternatively, blocs of trading partners/countries could adopt mirror legislation to implement an informal multilateral agreement that would require notification and grant of access by trading partners.
Either of these options would allow governments to take immediate steps to mitigate the next pandemic, free of the complexities and the time required for a much-needed comprehensive pandemic treaty. That larger effort will need considerable time and resources to accommodate complex national and international public health issues.
At present, there are unenforceable notification requirements found in the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241580496
No current proposal to reform the IHR includes enforceable provisions.
The scope of this effort is intentionally limited to three elements:
(1) notification;
(2) grant of access; and
(3) enforcement provisions or incentives to encourage compliance.
With effective notification and access, other elements of the global public health infrastructure, such as those provided by the World Health Organization, (WHO) and national health authorities, could be more successful with their remediation and mitigation efforts.
Historically, governments – alone -- negotiated international instruments to address uncontrollable hazards, such as those presented by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Those threats are the product of government initiatives, making their mitigation a government responsibility.
Naturally occurring pandemic threats are different. They are not the result of government initiative. Accordingly, the Project envisions that the private sector (e.g., airlines, aircraft manufacturers, travel and hospitality companies, health and casualty insurers) should have a role in advocating for an Agreement that would address the three elements above.
WHO has a singular role in international public health. The proposed concept-draft of a what might be contained in such a convention includes provisions that would rely on WHO for certain logistic, management and public health functions, while preserving neutrality of that organization with respect to the Convention itself. The Project anticipates that WHO would not have a role in consideration of, advocacy for, or enforcement of a convention as proposed. Those would be matters for a convention’s Signatory States.
On this site in the Documents page are:
(1) Pandemic Non-Proliferation Agreement Concept-Draft, to assist with discussion of the proposal (English and French);
(2) Argument for implementation of the proposed agreement (English) and Manifeste en vue d'une mise en exécution (French);
(3) by-laws or the “statuts” of the French non-governmental organization (French) and an English summary of same; and
(4) 'proof of concept' draft U.S. and Canadian legislation that would allow imposition of "pandemic risk-offset tariffs" on trading partners to encourage adoption of a minimum level of transparency through notification and grant of access.
See https://www.thewellnews.com/opinions/hidden-in-plain-sight-the-next-biosecurity-threat/
See also Newsmax article of March 21, 2024:
Group Proposes Treating Global Health
Scares Like Terror Threats
A face mask sign is displayed in a window along Roosevelt Avenue in the Queens borough of New York City on May 11, 2023. (Getty Images)
By Marisa Herman | Thursday, 21 March 2024 09:30 AM EDT
Recognizing that no mechanism exists that would have compelled China — or any other country — to notify other nations of an impending pandemic, a nongovernmental organization has proposed treating any future global health scares the same way terror threats are mitigated.
The Pandemic Mitigation Project, a France-based NGO of attorneys who specialize in international government relations and trade, biodefense experts, and medical professionals, has come up with a plan that utilizes the same tools that curb global terror threats and applies them to reducing the threat of the next pandemic.
"We know we are going to have another zoonotic pandemic break out somewhere," said Pandemic Mitigation Project founder Trip Mackintosh. "COVID showed what all of us knew — viruses don't respect national borders. We need to be told in advance."
As the group began looking at what went wrong in the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic and how to ensure the same failures aren't repeated, they began to realize the same policies used to minimize the risk of a terror plot could be leveraged in countering pandemics.
In a recently published op/ed titled "Hidden in Plain Sight: the Next Biosecurity Threat," Mackintosh and two other project members detail how the U.S. can use existing statutory authority to declare an emergency during a pandemic as well as condition most-favored-nation trading status on a country's agreement to notify and allow access in the event of a global health scare.
Mackintosh, a retired attorney who spent his career focused on nonproliferation agreements and export controls, pointed out that even though COVID-19 had all the characterizations of a weapon of mass destruction considering it was "uncontrollable, non-discriminatory, and unpredictable," it wasn't treated like one.
While there are international agreements in place to address nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, he quickly learned that international public health relies on the voluntary cooperation of nation states.
The article highlights that even four and a half years after the COVID-19 outbreak, there is still "no reliable warning system" for infectious diseases.
The group pointed out that The World Health Organization has no way to compel member states to notify it or others if a disease is spreading because there is no consequence for noncompliance. Under the International Health Regulations, there is a requirement of immediate notification.
They noted that China's slow response to the spreading virus "exposed the lethality of this gap."
Had the virus been a chemical or biological weapons incident, Mackintosh said China would've had "multiple levels of obligation" when it comes to notification and access.
Even if Beijing didn't comply with the requirements in place, he said the U.S. would have had certain agreements to fall back on to facilitate the release of more information.
He compared it to how the International Atomic Energy Agency was able to visit Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant after Russia captured it during its invasion of its neighbor. He said the fact that inspectors were allowed into the reactor demonstrated the "power" of these types of international agreements.
He then found himself wondering, "Why don't we have a corollary in international public health?"
"We alter our trading partners' behavior all the time," he said.
The authors contended that Beijing's silence "showed countries who are likely the source of the next global outbreak that a nation can refrain from alerting the world to a potentially deadly pathogen spreading in its population and refuse or delay entry by specialists from WHO or any other entity and nothing will happen.
"There will be no trade repercussions, no sanctions, no reduction in aid, no other action taken," they wrote.
While China remained silent, they pointed out how South Africa was essentially punished for its swift public notification about the omicron variant.
"Flights stopped. Hotels emptied. Trade slowed," they wrote.
With no penalty for staying silent, they note that the current rules give the next country that finds itself facing a rapidly spreading pathogen "every reason to stay quiet and uncooperative to protect short-term interests."
They warn that if the U.S. doesn't "leverage market-access requirements to change the behavior of our trading partners and foreign aid recipients, when the next pandemic comes, American biosecurity preparedness will be hostage — once again — to a foreign government's perceived self-interest."
To prevent that from happening, the group said the U.S. should take a page from how it handled terror threats in the wake of 9/11.
"After 9/11, when the United States faced terror threats that could arrive by air, land or sea, we unilaterally changed our rules," the group wrote. "We applied rigorous air passenger and cargo screening standards. Banks tightened know-your-customer requirements."
They noted that the result made the U.S. "more secure" without a global convention or international negotiations.
Instead, the group said the U.S. took "unilateral measures" that told trade partners: "If you want continued access to our market, this is what you have to do to mitigate the risk of global terrorism."
The U.S. implemented initiatives like the Container Security Initiative, which addressed the use of maritime containers to deliver a weapon, and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which required additional baggage screening.
They believe the same thing can be done with respect to pandemic threats.
Considering the U.S. trades with roughly 200 countries, they proposed leveraging market access to "reduce the threat of the next pandemic, as we did with global terrorism."
To do so, they contend the U.S. through the White House or Congress can use "existing statutory authority to declare an emergency and condition most-favored-nation trading status on a country's agreement to notify and allow access in case of a pathogenic outbreak."
Mackintosh noted that trade sanctions and export controls have always been a part of the United States' toolbox and can be used to condition or incentivize countries who want access to the American marketplace to be forthcoming about health scares.
Under the concept, which the group argues should be kept intentionally vague, the U.S. sets a policy with its trading partners that in the event of an outbreak there must be an open line of communication — or there could be potential consequences down the line.
"A vague requirement is more frightening than a clear one," he said. "The point is, once a capitol gets information they have a problem, they can't sit on it."
National security expert Daniel Gerstein, a board member of the Pandemic Mitigation Project and former acting undersecretary and deputy undersecretary in the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, said it is a "very challenging approach" because of how reliant the U.S. is on trade with certain countries.
"We know how delicate the balance is," he said. "As with anything, you have to be very gentle with your approach. You have to have a rational approach to implementing it or you can do enormous damage."
While Gerstein called the ultimate penalty of stopping trade with a country a "suicide pact," the group believes the threat may be compelling enough to encourage compliance.
"It's not a question of applying a penalty," Mackintosh said. "It's simply saying if you don't move in a direction we like, you may not get a result you like."
Marisa Herman ✉
Marisa Herman, a Newsmax senior reporter, focuses on major and investigative stories. A University of Florida graduate, she has more than a decade of experience as a reporter for newspapers, magazines, and websites.
© 2024 Newsmax. All rights reserved.
For French version of proposal see also https://or www.icc-france.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/EI_119.pdf
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Please use the contact link on this site to reach the Project to learn more about the initiative and how to become involved in support of this important effort.
The Project, “Pandemic Mitigation Project – L’initiative pour atténuer les pandémies”, is a non-governmental organization formed in France. It is a non-profit organization (French “association”) that does not solicit monetary contributions. The Project's European Union Transparency Register public identification number is 278847041584-96.